Philippine e-Legal Forum

In our recent final examination in Criminal Law II, the following question was propounded:

1. Where a minor under 18 years but over 9 years, who acted with discernment, is charged for an offense defined and penalized by the RPC which calls for the imposition of a capital penalty, is he entitled to a privilege mitigating circumstance of minority under Art. 68 of the RPC nothwithstanding the explicit provision of Art. 63? Is he entitled to the benefits of PD 603?

The author offered the following answers:

1. It is believed that Art. 68 of the RPC is deemed repealed by R.A. No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006″. However, jurisprudence tells us that such repeal is merely implied because the repealing clause of the special law (Section 71, R.A. No. 9344) does not specifically mention a repeal of Art. 68. Settled is the rule that the failure to add specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal, unless an irreconcilable inconsistencies exist in the terms of the new and old law (Gayo vs. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477, 28 February 2005).

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist (Hon. Executive Secretary et. al. vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, G.R. No. 164171, 22 August 2006). In Thornton vs. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, 16 August 2004, the Supreme Court held that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal.

The rule is settled that minority under 18 years is a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68 (People vs. Jose, 71 SCRA 273).

Above all, case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy.

In light of the foregoing, the new rule on age of criminal responsibility and applicability of Art. 68 may be summarized as follows:

a) A minor (under 15 but over 9 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense and a minor 15 years above but under 18 years of age who acted without discernment) are totally exempt from criminal liability pursuant to Sec. 6 of RA 9344 but they are subject to an intervention program. Hence, Art. 68 does not govern.
b) A minor (above 15 years but below 18 years of age who acted with discernment) is entitled to a PMC of minority under Art. 68 when such minor is sentenced to jail after the child in conflict with law failed to fulfill his rehabilitation program under Chapter 2 of R.A. No. 9344.

Art. 68 applies despite the explicit provision of Art. 63, because Art. 68 is an exception of par. 1 of Art. 63. Art. 63 is a general rule and, moreover, Art. 68 is favorable to the accused.

2) Section 192 of PD 603 does not apply to a minor under 15 yrs but above 9 years of age and a minor above 15 years but under 18 years of age who acted without discernment, charged with a capital offense penalized by the RPC. The reason for this is that R.A. No. 9344 totally exempts them from criminal liability.

However, a minor above 15 years but under 18 years of age who is charged with capital offense defined and penalized under the RPC, and who acted with discernment, is not entitled to the benefits of PD 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict With Law), because he is charged with an offense which calls for an imposition of a capital punishment. Under this law, the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In a most recent jurisprudence on juvenile justice (Declarador vs. Gubatan and Bansales, GR No. No. 159208, 18 August 2006), the Supreme Court held that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing of the benefits of a suspended sentence. The term “punishable” refers to the possible, not actual sentence. It is concerned with penalty which may be, and not which is necesarily, imposed after trial. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile

Notwithstanding the exemption of the child in conflict with law from death penalty under R.A. No. 9344 and the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 proscribing death penalty and making reclusion perpetua as the appropriate penalty, the child in conflict with law or youthful offender is still disqualified from availing of the benefits of a suspended sentence as the penalty of reclusion perpetua is one of the disqualifications.

(N.B. The foregoing is solely the opinion of our guest author. Any other opinions, concurring or dissenting, are most welcome. This is an interesting topic. - Atty. Fred)