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EN BANC [A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691. November 19, 2004] THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, complainants, vs. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: On January 16, 2004, we rendered a Decision suspending for a period of one (1) year Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, herein respondent. He was charged by the above-named complainants with (1) gross ignorance of the law; (2) violation of the constitutional rights of the accused; (3) arrogance, oppressive conduct, and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (4) impropriety. For our resolution is complainants’ motion for reconsideration of our Decision praying that the penalty of one (1) year suspension we imposed upon respondent judge be modified. Instead, we should dismiss him from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to any re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit. Firstly, the assailed Decision was a product of our extensive and serious deliberation. We carefully evaluated respondent’s infractions before imposing upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the service. To reconsider our Decision sans new and compelling reason is plain flip-flopping which will result in serious injustice to respondent. Even complainants’ motion for reconsideration provides no sufficient justification. It does not raise new matters or issues demanding new judicial determination. In other words, it is but a reiteration of reasons and arguments previously set forth in complainants’ pleadings which we already determined and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered. The facts, the issues, and the law contained in our Decision having remained unchanged, we find no reason why we should reconsider it. Secondly, the cases relied upon by complainants in pointing out that the penalty imposed upon respondent is not commensurate to his offenses are based on entirely different factual settings. Complainants cited the following cases: (1) Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC, Br. 54, Manila, of an Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense,[1] (2) Dizon vs. Calimag,[2] (3) Guray vs. Bautista,[3] (4) Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sanchez,[4] (5) Mamba vs. Garcia,[5] (6) In Re: An Undated Letter with the Heading “Expose” of a Concerned Mediaman on the Alleged Illegal Acts of Judge Julian C. Ocampo III,[6] (7) Agpalasin vs. Agcaoili,[7] (8) Magarang vs. Jardin, Sr.,[8] (9) Castaños vs. Escaño, Jr.,[9] (10) State Prosecutors vs. Muro,[10] (11) Chin vs. Gustilo,[11] (12) Francisco vs. Springael,[12] (13) Lantaco, Sr. vs. Judge Llamas,[13] and (14) Carreon vs. Flores.[14] The common thread in the above cases, which justifies the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service upon the erring judges, is the fact that the acts committed by respondents therein involve malice, wrongful motives, corrupt intentions or moral depravity. Apparently, of the thirteen (13) cases cited, eight (8) were either for gross misconduct, serious misconduct or corruption. Five (5) cases were for gross ignorance of the law. In two (2) of these cases, only reprimand and fine were imposed upon respondents. In the remaining three (3), respondents were penalized with dismissal from the service because of facts peculiar to said cases, definitely not similar to the facts in the instant case. In Castaños vs. Escaño,[15] in addition to gross ignorance of the law, respondent was also found guilty of grave abuse of authority for using contempt as a retaliatory measure. In Lantaco, Sr. vs. Judge Llamas,[16] respondent judge repeatedly ignored our directive for him to file comment. And in State Prosecutors vs. Muro,[17] though respondent judge was initially dismissed, he was reinstated upon his filing of a motion for reconsideration. It bears reiterating that in all these cases, malice, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or wrongful intention are present. Here, respondent’s questioned actuations are not tainted by any of these incidents. Hence, we can not consider the above cited cases as precedents applicable to his case. Thirdly, it is not true that respondent has not shown remorse or repentance. In his motion for reconsideration, he manifested his immediate compliance with our Decision dated January 16, 2004 on the premise that the “Supreme Court has spoken.” A truth, commonly accepted in civilized institutions, is that acceptance of punishment often mitigates the gravity of a violation of a duty. The ultimate commitment of one’s fate to legal process means that under an obligation of consent or a duty to support just institutions, one’s breach is also substantially lessened.[18] Although respondent judge moved for the reduction of his penalty, the same was premised on his length of service in the judiciary. His motion merely appealed to our “compassion and understanding,” thus, showing humility in his moral judgment. And fourthly, a more thorough review of the facts as well as the applicable jurisprudence shows that the penalty of dismissal from the service is disproportionate to respondent judge’s infractions. I The first charge of gross ignorance of the law must fail. First, there exists a judicial remedy sufficient to correct respondent judge’s alleged mistakes in the imposition of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. And second, there is no evidence to show that he was moved by bad faith, malice, dishonesty or corruption in imposing the penalties. Settled is the rule that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.[19] The law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities committed by the trial court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in application of procedural or substantive law or in appreciation or admission of evidence) include a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial, and appeal. On the other hand, the extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, or a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.[20] Today, the established policy is that disciplinary proceedings against judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.[21] In the present administrative case, respondent judge is found to have repeatedly misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in seventeen (17) cases.[22] The records, however, show that of these seventeen (17) cases, twelve (12)[23] are pending appeal in the Appellate Court. One (1)[24] is subject of a motion for reconsideration before respondent judge. Two (2)[25]one (1) case,[26] we affirmed his Decision in our Resolution dated October 9, 2000. were decided by him on the basis of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense by both accused. And in With the foregoing circumstances, it is therefore both improper and premature to hold respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Following established doctrine, the pendency of the appeals is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent judge.[27] The rationale is that if subsequent developments prove respondent judge’s challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him after all. In Flores vs. Abesamis,[28] we held: “Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and disposition they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if ‘there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order’ or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. . . .” (Underscoring supplied) To declare that respondent judge misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law to criminal cases on appeal will only result to undesirable consequences, foremost of which is the existence of conflicting decisions. The danger is heightened by the fact that the complainants in this administrative case are not the counsel of the accused in most of the cases mentioned but mere members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines who only sorted out respondent judge’s Decisions and on the basis thereof, concluded that he erred in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[29] They neither looked at the records of the cases nor consulted the parties concerned. As a matter of fact, during cross-examination, they admitted that they do not know personally the facts of the cases. It bears reiterating that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[30] Here, the administrative complaint does not even assert that in imposing the penalties, respondent judge was so motivated. In fact, complainants failed to present positive evidence to show that he was prompted by malice or corrupt motive in imposing the assailed penalties. Even the records, specifically the transcript of stenographic notes, reveal nothing of that sort. In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.,[31] we ruled that “good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.” In this case, reprimand was considered an appropriate penalty. In People vs. Serrano, Sr.,[32] respondent Judge Pepe P. Domael allowed an appeal from a judgment of acquittal. Although the accused did not object to the appeal interposed by the prosecution, we held that respondent Judge Domael should have known that granting such appeal would constitute double jeopardy. However, since the acts in question were not shown to be tainted with bad faith, fraud, or malice, they were not considered as so gross to warrant the dismissal of respondent judge from the service. Indeed, the fact that herein respondent judge misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same merely constitutes an error of judgment. To reiterate, a judicial determination or mistake based merely on errors of judgment, and without corrupt or improper motives, will not supply a ground for removal, and this is true although such errors are numerous.[33] II Anent the second charge of violation of the Constitutional rights of the accused, complainants mentioned two cases, i.e., People vs. Baniqued[34] and Surla vs. Dimla,[35] wherein respondent judge failed to decide pending motions within the prescribed period. In People vs. Baniqued,[36] respondent judge, according to complainants, took more than one (1) year to decide the prosecution’s motion for the preventive suspension of Ceferino Baniqued. At first glance, the delay seems to be unreasonable and attributable to respondent judge. However, a more probing inquiry on the matter shows that the delay was due to the maneuverings of Atty. Lauro C. Gacayan, Baniqued’s own counsel and one of the complainants herein. The records show that as early as December 2, 1997, former Presiding Judge Ruben Costales had deemed submitted for resolution the prosecution’s motion for preventive suspension. Notwithstanding so, Atty. Gacayan filed several pleadings[37] insisting that it was still “premature to consider the incident submitted for resolution because the mandatory ‘pre-suspension hearing’ has not yet been terminated.” On August 18, 1998, the motion for preventive suspension was again considered submitted for resolution, this time by respondent judge. Pending resolution, Atty. Gacayan filed a demurrer to evidence praying that the case of People vs. Baniqued[38] be dismissed for lack of evidence to support the conviction of the accused.[39] This was followed by a supplement to the demurrer to evidence.[40] Obviously, the delay in the resolution of the prosecution’s motion was, in the main, due to Atty. Gacayan’s persistence that a pre-suspension hearing be conducted. Not only did he file one pleading after another, he also filed a demurrer to evidence. This only complicated the matters before respondent judge. Naturally, if the demurrer to evidence is found to be meritorious, then the necessary consequence is the dismissal of the motion for preventive suspension on the ground that it has become moot and academic. Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, complainant Atty. Gacayan cannot now pretend that he was not responsible for the delay and that respondent judge deserves all the blame. As counsel of accused Baniqued, he had resorted to all possible legal maneuverings just to prevent the suspension of his client. He cannot now extricate himself from the result of his legal strategies and adopt a different stance just to crucify respondent judge. Certainly, we cannot countenance such effrontery. In Gaspar vs. Bayhon,[41] we ruled that “a judge should not be blamed for the delay in the disposition of a case when the delay is beyond his control, especially in the absence of any showing that it was done in bad faith and intended to prejudice a party to the case or it was motivated by some ulterior end.” Indeed, it is extremely ironic that Atty. Gacayan is so vigorous in invoking his client’s right to speedy trial when what was delayed is the resolution of the prosecution’s motion. If there is someone who has been prejudiced by the delay, it is the prosecution, not the accused. He has no reason to complain. In Surla vs. Dimla,[42] allegedly it took respondent judge four (4) months to resolve an unopposed motion for reconsideration. This appears to be Atty. Gacayan’s last-ditch attempt to revive a dead case. As pointed out by respondent judge, the case was initially dismissed for failure to prosecute. Upon plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the case was reinstated. Due to several subsequent unjustified absences on the part of plaintiff, the case was again dismissed on the same ground. No motion for reconsideration was filed until the order of dismissal became final.[43] III The third charge imputes to respondent arrogance, oppressive conduct and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. These offenses are not so grave as to warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Complainants claim that respondent judge’s displayed arrogance when he imposed time constraint on Atty. Federico Mandapat’s cross-examination of the witness in People vs. Andrada. We believe otherwise. The transcript of stenographic notes shows that respondent judge required Atty. Mandapat to approach the bench before advising him to ask only relevant questions and not to be repetitious. That he was required to approach the bench only proves that respondent judge did not intend to embarrass him. And while it is true that respondent judge limited the cross-examination to only ten (10) minutes, it was because he (Atty. Mandapat) had already spent a considerable time cross-examining the witness. However, his cross-examination was extended the next day. In fact, respondent judge allowed him to cross-examine the witness “without limitation.”[44] At this juncture, it must be stressed that it is both the right and duty of a trial judge to control the cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of conserving the time of the court and of protecting the witnesses from prolonged and needless examination.[45] In People vs. Gorospe,[46] we ruled that “while cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice.” Anent respondent judge’s statement to the client of Atty. Joris Karl Dacawi not to pay the latter’s attorney’s fees because he did nothing but merely to seek the postponement of the case, the same does not constitute oppression, though, I must say, it was really uncalled for. Oppression is a “misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury.” It is an “act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.”[47] Respondent judge’s utterance can hardly qualify as an act of cruelty or severity or excessive use of authority. Obviously, the statement was uttered to discourage lawyers from seeking postponement of trials. A strict judge that he is, it is understandable that he was irritated by Atty. Dacawi’s request to postpone the case on the ground that his client was not feeling well when actually, the latter was in court. Of course, there is a limit to a judge’s patience and leniency. Though it is required that respondent judge maintains a firm resolve in the face of provocations by untoward defense tactics, and display such resolve with the appearance of dispassionate equanimity, however, any showing of impatience or gratuitous observations left unsaid may be tolerated to some extent. After all, as a judge, he has the obligation to remind lawyers of their duties to the public, to their client, and to the adverse party and his counsel, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before the court.[48] Complainants, particularly Atty. Reynaldo Agranzamendez, lament respondent judge’s conduct of ordering him to stand during the promulgation of the Decision in People vs. Cruz[49] in which he was the counsel de oficio, thus, making him appear to be the accused. While respondent judge’s actuation is irregular, however, we believe that such offense does not justify his dismissal from the service. With regard to respondent judge’s delay in the release of the copies of the Decisions in People vs. Cas[50] and People vs. Malapit,[51] there is no showing of malice or bad faith on his part. In People vs. Cas,[52] complainant Atty. Jurgenson Lagdao filed a Notice of Appeal which states: “ACCUSED, with the assistance of counsel, hereby gives notice that he is appealing to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Honorable Court promulgated on June 22, 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release, for being patently contrary to law and the attending facts and circumstances. x x x” Respondent judge directed Atty. Lagdao to modify the wording of such Notice of Appeal on the ground that the phrase “a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release” is inaccurate considering that copies of the Decision were already released to the parties. This is evident from the Manifestation and Explanation filed by Atty. Lagdao quoted as follows: “THE UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states: 1. That a notice of appeal from the judgment promulgated on 22 June 1999 was filed on July 5, 1999; 2. That in said notice, it was alleged that a copy of the decision has yet to be released by the Honorable Court; 3. That between 10:00 and 11:00 o’ clock in the morning of 5 July 1999, the mother of the accused came to the office and she was assisted by Atty. Henry Patrick Villanueva in inquiring about the decision and it was then that Atty. Villanueva was furnished copy thereof; 4. That the notice of appeal was actually prepared and handed to one of the clerks in the office for filing at about 8:25 in the morning of the same day. However, unknown to undersigned counsel, the notice was filed only at about 1:30 in the afternoon for the reason that the clerk attended to several clients and prepared reports such that it was only after taking lunch that he realized not having filed the notice earlier; 5. That had the undersigned counsel been aware that it was only in the afternoon that the notice was filed, then he should have corrected or changed the notice prepared earlier to indicate receipt of the decision; 6. That to rectify the notice of appeal, undersigned counsel hereby states for the record that a copy of the decision was received on 5 July 1999; 7. That the undersigned apologizes for what had happened and begs for the understanding of the Honorable Court.” Clearly, respondent judge was justified in requiring Atty. Lagdao to change the tenor of his Notice of Appeal to conform to the truth that copies of the Decision were indeed previously released to the parties. In People vs. Malapit,[53] respondent judge failed to release to the parties copies of the Decision on the same day it was promulgated. There were typographical errors in the Decision that have to be corrected by the stenographers. Atty. Itliong-Rivera positively testified on this matter. Significantly, the delay did not prejudice the accuseds’ right to appeal. In a number of cases wherein the respondent judge committed delay in the release of decisions to the parties, the penalty meted upon him is only reprimand. Our rulings in Dizon vs. Judge Lopez,[54] Mangulabnan vs. Tecson[55] and Castro vs. Judge Malazo[56] are relevant. IV Finally, on the appointment of Eufemio Gula as Driver I, suffice it to say that it was the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Baguio which appointed him to such position through Resolution No. 230, Series of 1999. His item was later on changed to Utility Worker II, through Resolution No. 298, Series of 1999,[57] upon the request of Clerk of Court Delilah Gonzales-Munoz. The assailed appointment was therefore beyond the control of respondent judge. As a final word, let it be stressed that the administration of justice is primarily a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. The judge expects a lawyer to properly perform his role in this task in the same manner that the lawyer expects a judge to do his part.[58] Their relation should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in this manner can each minimize occasions for delinquency and help attain effectively the ends of justice.[59] The conflict between the herein parties could have been avoided if only they heeded the foregoing call. Indeed, in the last analysis, the quality of justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of the lawyers practicing in the courts and of the judges who have been selected from among them. While respondent judge indeed committed infractions, the absence of malice, bad faith, fraud, or dishonesty on his part, does not warrant his removal from office. Significantly, eleven (11) witnesses[60] who are also members of the IBP, Baguio City Chapter contradicted complainants’ charges. They testified that respondent judge’s integrity is above board and that he administers justice effectively. ACCORDINGLY, complainants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The penalty of one (1) year suspension from office imposed upon respondent judge is retained. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Panganiban, J., joins the dissenting opinions of JJ. Santiago & Callejo, Sr. Ynares-Santiago and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see dissenting opinion. Corona, J. on leave. [1] 367 SCRA 285 (2001). [2] 365 SCRA 448 (2001). [3] 360 SCRA 488 (2001). [4] 359 SCRA 577 (2001). [5] 359 SCRA 426 (2001). [6] 359 SCRA 1 (2001). [7] 330 SCRA 250 (2000). [8] 330 SCRA 79 (2000). [9] 251 SCRA 174 (1995). [10] 236 SCRA 505 (1994). [11] 247 SCRA 175 (1995). [12] 139 SCRA 107 (1985). [13] 108 SCRA 502 (1981). [14] 64 SCRA 238 (1975). [15] Supra. [16] Supra. [17] Supra. [18] Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality, 1989, pp. 239-240 [19] Santos vs. Orlino, 296 SCRA 101 (1998); see also Garcia vs. Pasia, 317 SCRA 155, 158 (1999). [20] Barbers vs. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568, February 15, 2001. [21] Flores vs. Abesamis, A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302, 316-317. [22] Decision at 34-37. [23] 1) People vs. Joel Ramos, et al.; 2) People vs. German Abarquez; 3) People vs. Rolando Tawanna, et al.; 4) People vs. Jose Tamo, et al.; 5) People vs. Johnson Simsim; 6) People vs. Moses Polic-ew; 7) People vs. Renato Bernal; 8) People vs. John Baliling; 9) People vs. Melchor Bawalan, et al.; 10) People vs. Edwin Longaquit, et al.; 11) People vs. Joseph Samir Kairuz; and 12) People vs. Liwayway Cruz (Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I, Exhibit “6” and “6-C”). [24] People vs. Bernardo Polic-ew (Records, Exhibit “A-8” at 19). [25] 1) People vs. Paul Afiagan, and 2) People vs. Manuel Carino (Folder of Exhibits, Volume I, Exhibit “6-B”). [26] People vs. Rose Dalmacio, et al. (Folder of Exhibits, Volume II, Exhibit “48”). [27] Barbers vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. [28] Supra. [29] Except complainant Atty. Jurgenson Lagdao who was the counsel in People vs. Afiagan, People vs. Longaquit, People vs. Bawalan and People vs. Baliling, all of which are pending appeal with the Appellate Court. [30] Heirs of the Late Nasser D. Yasin, vs. Felix, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-94-1167, December 4, 1995, 250 SCRA 545. [31] A.M. No. RTJ-93-1088, January 18, 1995, 240 SCRA 154. [32] G.R. No. 135451, September 30, 1999, 315 SCRA 686. [33] 48 C.J.S. § 27 at 976-977, citing Saint vs. Simon, 110 So. 826, 162 La. 596; Villani vs. Duffy, 175 A. 373, 114 N.J. Law 60; Matter of Droege, 114 N.Y.S. 375, 129 App. Div. 866, appeal dismissed 90 N.E. 340, 197 N.Y. 44. [34] Criminal Case No. 13949-R. [35] Civil Case No. 3322-R. [36] Supra. [37] Manifestation and Motion dated December 11, 1997 (Folder of Exhibits, Volume I, Exhibit “1”) and Rejoinder to the Motion for Suspension dated on July 1, 1998 (Folder of Exhibits, Volume I, Exhibit “2”). (See also TSN, June 23, 2000 at 21-35) [38] Supra. [39] Filed on July 7, 1999 (Folder of Exhibits, Volume I, Exhibit “3”). [40] Dated September 1, 1999 (Folder of Exhibits, Volume I, Exhibit “4”). [41] Adm. Matter No. RTJ-97-1388, 86 SCAD 546. [42] Supra. [43] Records, Volume I at 541. [44] TSN, June 23, 2000 at 128-131. [45] 98 C.J.S. § 404, citing State vs. Stone, 36 S.E. 2d 704, 226 N.C. 97. [46] G.R. No. L-51513, May 15, 1984, 129 SCRA 233. [47] Black’s Law Dictionary at 1093. [48] Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics at 327. [49] Criminal Case No. 7304-R. [50] Criminal Case No. 15306-R. [51] Criminal Cases Nos. 15320-R, 15323-R, 15327-R and 15571-R. [52] Supra. [53] Supra. [54] Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 483. The delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he can intelligently prepare his appeal or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 6 complainant's period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did not begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of the basis of the conviction. [55] A.M. No. 2112-CFI, December 29, 1980, 101 SCRA 810. [56] A.M. No. 1237-CAR, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 164. [57] Folder of Exhibits, Volume II, Exhibit ”41”. [58] Lugue vs. Kayanan, No. L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; Romero vs. Valle, Adm. Matter No. R-192-RTJ, January 9, 1987, 147 SCRA 197. [59] Agpalo, Judicial Ethics, 6th Edition, 1997, at 436. [60] Atty. Victoria C.M. Sturch stated that she is impressed by the way respondent judge implemented decorum in his courtroom. He does not tolerate “talking” inside the courtroom, unlike other Judges who do not even call the attention of those concerned while the session is going on. Atty. Primitivo C. Jularbal testified that while respondent judge imposes fine on lawyers for being late, however, there is really no effort on his part to enforce payment. It is just his manner of disciplining lawyers who appear in his sala. In fact, after he (witness) was fined by respondent judge for being late (although until now he has not paid it), he has tried his best to be in court before the scheduled hearing to avoid being fined. He has not witnessed any arrogant or oppressive conduct on the part of respondent judge. Nor has the latter been discourteous or disrespectful to old lawyers. In fact, respondent judge has not been discourteous or disrespectful to him. Atty. Ma. Inglay Capuyon-Fokno, to refute the charges of gross ignorance of the law and arrogance, testified that respondent is diligent and serious in the performance of his task. He is always prompt, i.e., he opens his sessions at exactly 8:30 a.m. and conducts proceedings in an orderly manner. Justice Sixto Domondon, refuting the charges of ignorance of the law, arrogance and violation of judicial ethics, testified that he filed an administrative case against respondent judge, for which the latter has already been punished. However, he (witness) did not ask for respondent judge’s inhibition in three (3) civil cases because he believed in his integrity, capacity and moral will to dispose justice fairly regardless of the litigants’ personalities or stature in life. Atty. Lourdes Maita Andres testified that in her experience with respondent judge, she knows that he is fair and even-handed because he is not bias to any party or lawyer. In fact, respondent is a welcome change in Baguio City. It is refreshing that there is a new judge who cannot be influenced by some lawyers or anybody. He decides cases on the merits. He is not arrogant. When she was late once, she was merely asked to explain. Respondent judge does not hang around with lawyers. In fact, when she wanted to seek audience with him in order to ask for a resetting, he refused to see her unless the other party was present. Respondent judge refused to accept a gift sent by a party in the case of “People vs. Rolando Clemente.” She stated in her affidavit that “she can count judges who are even-handed in dealing with cases before them, without showing any bias towards lawyer’s cause,” “that Judge Pamintuan is a welcome change in Baguio City where some lawyers are able to get their way in some courts which have caused her to bear disillusions against the judiciary;” and that “she personally feels that she need not be wary nor afraid of the capability of an opponent in bribing the judge to win the case because Judge Pamintuan has exhibited a personality where he would not be cowed by any lawyer or group of lawyers to do their bidding.” Atty. Juan B. Valdez stated that he has appeared before the respondent judge and in his personal observation, he has been fair, although several times, he imposed fines on lawyers who came late, like Atty. Agranzamendez, or lawyers who appeared in court with sleeves rolled up or who wore barong with unbuttoned front. In fact, one time, he ordered a person reading a newspaper inside his courtroom to step out. Several times, he directed the Sheriff to keep the people quiet at the lobby as an observance of court decorum. Lina de Guzman Dalusong testified that the proceedings before respondent are more organized because he is on time. The list of cases to be heard is now posted so much so that one would already know the number of years a case has been pending. Respondent judge settles disputes by talking to the parties in the presence of their counsel. This has not been done by the other presiding judges. Prosecutor Lilian Dris S. Alejo stated that being a State Prosecutor, she has appeared before respondent judge from 1996 to 1998. Per her personal observation, respondent judge is reasonable because whenever she moved for a resetting, he heard her reasons and if justified, he granted her motion. He is fair because when he admonished her for her fiery temper, he did not humiliate or embarrass her. Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin stated that he is aware of the practice of respondent judge to order counsel and accused to stand during the promulgation of the decision. In fact, he was present when respondent ordered Atty. Agranzamendez to stand up during the promulgation of the decision in “People vs. Liwayway Cruz.” Respondent judge told Atty. Agranzamendez, “Don’t argue with the court,” his usual expression, and not “Shut up!” as alleged by herein complainants; Respondent judge was able to unclog the docket of his court because the hearing starts promptly at 8:30 a.m.; He (witness) admitted there were times he was late in coming to court, but he has never been fined because of his satisfactory explanation. Before, respondent judge would fine lawyers who came late without giving them any chance to explain, but not anymore because he has already softened his stance. |
