G.R. No. 154182 - Jaromay Laurente Pamaos Law Offices

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154182. December 17, 2004]

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for unlawful intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license in favor of a business enterprise in which he has a pecuniary interest may be convicted, together with his spouse, of violation of that same provision premised on his mere possession of such interest.

Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337 convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia.

The indictment reads:[2]

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA TEVES of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:

That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners pleaded “not guilty.” Pre-trial and trial were thereafter set.

The petitioners and the prosecution agreed on the authenticity of the prosecution’s documentary evidence. Thus, the prosecution dispensed with the testimonies of witnesses and formally offered its documentary evidence marked as Exhibits “A” to “V.”[3]

On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence.[4] On 29 July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits “A” to “S” of the prosecution’s evidence but rejected Exhibits “T,” “U,” and “V.”[5] It also denied petitioners’ demurrer to evidence,[6] as well as their motion for reconsideration.[7] This notwithstanding, the petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were, nonetheless, dispensing with the presentation of witnesses because the evidence on record are inadequate to support their conviction.

On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision[8] (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and Teresita Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) imposing upon them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum; and (3) ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the Government, as well as perpetual disqualification from public office.[9] The conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds that (a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his pecuniary interest in said cockpit; (b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the “owner/licensee” of the cockpit; and (c) since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from 1983 until 1992, their property relations as husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of the conjugal partnership of gains. Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners have pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance of a business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center on or about 4 February 1992 for not being well-founded.

On 26 August 2002, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari[10] seeking to annul and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

At first, we denied the petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.[11] But upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,[12] we reinstated the petition.[13]

The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.

Second, according to the petitioners, their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit in 1992 was not proved. The Sandiganbayan presumed that since Mayor Teves was the cockpit operator and licensee in 1989, said interest continued to exist until 1992. It also presumed that the cockpit was the conjugal property of Mayor Teves and his wife, and that their pecuniary interest thereof was direct. But under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any interest thereon is at most inchoate and indirect.

Also assigned as glaring error is the conviction of Teresita Teves, who is not a public officer. In the information, only Mayor Teves was accused of “having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the operation of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Negros Oriental.” His wife was merely charged as a co-conspirator of her husband’s alleged act of “while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, … willfully, unlawfully and criminally caus[ing] the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate” the said cockpit arena. Teresita Teves could not be convicted because conspiracy was not established. Besides, the Sandiganbayan had already absolved the petitioners of this offense.

On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), insists that the uncontroverted documentary evidence proved that petitioner Edgar Teves had direct pecuniary interest over the cockpit in question as early as 26 September 1983. That interest continued even though he transferred the management thereof to his wife Teresita Teves in 1992, since their property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. The existence of that prohibited interest is by itself a criminal offense under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991. It is necessarily included in the offense charged against the petitioners, i.e., for violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which proscribes the possession of a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction in connection with which the person possessing the financial interest intervenes in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or any law from having any interest. The use of the conjunctive word “or” demonstrates the alternative mode or nature of the manner of execution of the final element of the violation of the provision. Although the information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. There was, therefore, no violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature or cause of the accusation against them in view of the variance doctrine, which finds statutory support in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is not totally devoid of merit.

Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

…

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted legislative definition of the crime of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction;

3. He either

a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest; or

b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.

There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The first mode is if in connection with his pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

We quote herein the Sandiganbayan’s declaration regarding petitioners’ culpability anent the first mode:

…[T]hat portion of the Information which seeks to indict the spouses Teves for his causing the issuance of a business permit/license to operate the Valencia cockpit on or about February 4, 1992 is not well-founded.

… Mayor Edgar Teves could not have issued a permit to operate the cockpit in the year 1992 because as of January 1, 1992 the license could be issued only by the Sangguniang Bayan. He may have issued the permit or license in 1991 or even before that when he legally could, but that is not the charge. The charge is for acts committed in 1992.[14] [Emphasis supplied].

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is “not well-founded.” This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3)[15] of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,[16] under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.[17]

A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator in the absence of a finding that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the offense charged. In short, the Sandiganbayan correctly absolved the petitioners of the charge based on the first mode. And there is no need to belabor this point.

The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law based on the second mode. It reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor Teves had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves, then Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, of causing, “while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife … the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves.” The last part of the dispositive portion of the information states that “said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.”

A careful reading of the information reveals that the afore-quoted last part thereof is merely an allegation of the second element of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or indirect “financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction.” Not by any stretch of imagination can it be discerned or construed that the afore-quoted last part of the information charges the petitioners with the second mode by which Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree with the petitioners that the charge was for unlawful intervention in the issuance of the license to operate the Valencia Cockpit. There was no charge for possession of pecuniary interest prohibited by law.

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,[18] owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983[19] with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989[20] he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.[21] His affidavit[22] dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he “turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure” is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

…

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest. But can the petitioners be convicted thereof, considering that it was not charged in the information?

The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction, whether or not prohibited by law; and

3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.

On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and

3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

The next question we have to grapple with is under what law should petitioner Edgar Teves be punished. It must be observed that Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is a general provision, it being applicable to all prohibited interests; while Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 is a special provision, as it specifically treats of interest in a cockpit. Notably, the two statutes provide for different penalties. The Anti-Graft Law, particularly Section 9, provides as follows:

SEC. 9. Penalties for violations. – (a) Any public official or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest….

On the other hand, Section 514 of the LGC of 1991 prescribes a lighter penalty; thus:

SECTION 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business Transactions or Possessing Illegal Pecuniary Interest. – Any local official and any person or persons dealing with him who violate the prohibitions provided in Section 89 of Book I hereof shall be punished with imprisonment for six months and one day to six years, or a fine of not less than Three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.

It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute.[23] Or where two statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail over the other.[24]

Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which specifically prohibits local officials from possessing pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and which, in itself, prescribes the punishment for violation thereof, is paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes possession of prohibited interest in a general manner. Moreover, the latter took effect on 17 August 1960, while the former became effective on 1 January 1991. Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft Law has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the later expression of legislative will.[25]

In the imposition on petitioner Edgar Teves of the penalty provided in the LGC of 1991, we take judicial notice of the fact that under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41[26] thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.

Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. The charge against her is conspiracy in causing “the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center.” For this charge, she was acquitted. But as discussed earlier, that charge also includes conspiracy in the possession of prohibited interest.

Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design.[27]

Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse.[28] For a spouse or any person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators.[29]

Section 4(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, the provision which applies to private individuals, states:

SEC. 4. Prohibitions on private individuals. – …

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990[30] and 18 February 1991,[31] she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992,[32] she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991[33] and 1992,[34] which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee.

The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would render her equally liable as her husband. If ever she did those acts, it was because she herself was an owner of the cockpit. Not being a public official, she was not prohibited from holding an interest in cockpit. Prudence, however, dictates that she too should have divested herself of her ownership over the cockpit upon the effectivity of the LGC of 1991; otherwise, as stated earlier, considering her property relation with her husband, her ownership would result in vesting direct prohibited interest upon her husband.

In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.[35] The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Criminal Case No. 2337 is hereby MODIFIED in that (1) EDGAR Y. TEVES is convicted of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991, and is sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000; and (2) TERESITA Z. TEVES is hereby ACQUITTED of such offense.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Callejo, Sr., J., on leave, but left his oath of concurrence with the dissent of J. Tinga.

Tinga, J., dissenting opinion.

[1] Rollo, 30-47.

[2] Id., 52-53.

[3] Id., 56-63.

[4] Rollo, 69-71.

[5] Id., 80-81.

[6] Id., 72-79.

[7] Id., 82-90, 93.

[8] Id., 30-47.

[9] Id., 46.

[10] Rollo, 8-29.

[11] Id., 139.

[12] Id., 152-169.

[13] Id., 194.

[14] Rollo, 43.

[15] Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall

…

(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permit or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:

…

(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks: Provided, that existing rights should not be prejudiced…. [Emphasis supplied].

[16] Section 146 (1), B.P. Blg. 337.

[17] Section 446. Composition – (a) The sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the municipal chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the pambayang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members.

[18] Exh. “R,” Rollo, 317.

[19] Exh. “A,” Rollo, 298.

[20] Exh. “B,” Rollo, 299.

[21] Section 3 (ee), Rule 131, Rules on Evidence.

[22] Exh. “E,” Rollo, 302.

[23] Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil. 32, 35 (1952).

[24] Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut, Nos. L-27350-51, 11 May 19778, 83 SCRA 38, 53; Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66614, 25 January 1988, 157 SCRA 282.

[25] City of Naga v. Agna, No. L-36049, 31 May 1976, 71 SCRA 176.

[26] SEC. 41. Officials not to Engage in Business Transactions or Possess Pecuniary Interest.—It shall be unlawful for any local government official, directly or indirectly, individually or as a member of a firm:

(1) To engage in any business transaction with the local government unit of which he is an official or over which he has power of supervision, or with any of its authorized officials, boards, agents, or attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the local government unit to such person or firm;

(2) To purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such unit which shall be sold for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue of legal process at the suit of said unit;

(3) To be a surety for any person having contract or doing business with the local government unit for the performance of which surety may be required.

[27] Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890, 911 (1999), citing Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, 310 Phil. 14,19 (1995).

[28] Id.

[29] Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 331 Phil. 6 (1996).

[30] Exh. “F,” Rollo, 303.

[31] Exh. “J,” Rollo, 306.

[32] Exh. “M,” Rollo, 311.

[33] Exh. “I,” Rollo, 307.

[34] Exh. “N,” Rollo, 312.

[35] Timbal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136487, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 358 citing People v. Quindipan, 323 Phil. 497, 507 (1996).