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FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 125865. March 26, 2001] JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28, 2000, denying the petition for review. The Motion is anchored on the following arguments: 1) THE DFA’S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS. 2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE. 3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB). 4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA PROTOCOL. 5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)-MANDALUYONG. 6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. This case has its origin in two criminal Informations[1] for grave oral defamation filed against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.[2] Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty. On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum. For the most part, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the “Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank,” to wit: Officers ands staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities: (a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner’s and intervenor’s Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner’s utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno. Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur. Puno, J., Pls. See concurring opinion. [1] Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 & 53171 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, presided by Hon. Ma. Luisa Quijano- Padilla. [2] SCA Case No. 743 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, presided by Hon. Mariano M. Umali. |
